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and Associate Director 
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Last fall's stock market crash was certainly the biggest 
economic news of the year. On October 19, 1987, the 
Dow Jones industrial average stock price fell 22.6 per-
cent, by far the largest one-day decline in the market's 
history. After the crash, most economists lowered their 
predictions for economic growth in 1988, which seems 
reasonable since, in the past, large declines in stock 
prices have usually weakened U.S. economic activity a 
lot. But now, in March 1988, economists are stumped: 
Despite what history says, October's stock market 
crash doesn't seem to have significantly slowed eco-
nomic activity yet, and it doesn't seem likely to this 
year—and we don't know why. 
A Puzzle 
The usual negative effect on economic activity of large 
declines in stock prices is clear in the historical 
evidence. Also clear, though, is the surprising strength 
in recent economic data and in the predictions of a 
fairly reliable statistical model of the U.S. economy. 
Historical Evidence .. . 
One view of history strongly suggests that the stock 
market crash should have some effect on economic 
activity. This is the data on what has happened to output 
in past years when stock prices fell as much as they did 
on October 19. To get a sample of past declines that 
large, we must examine declines that took as long as six 
months. There have been eight such declines since 
1920 (and before 1987). And after six of those eight 
declines, a recession began within six months of the end 
of the decline and usually lasted at least one year.
1 
More recent historical evidence is consistent with 
that general view and provides, as well, an estimate of 
just how much the crash should affect economic activ-
ity in 1988. Economic data since World War II suggest 
that the effect on both consumer spending and the 
economy as a whole could be quite large. 
The impact on consumer spending is perhaps the 
easiest to estimate. Consumers feel the crash, of course, 
as a loss in their wealth, and that generally reduces how 
much they spend. According to standard estimates, in 
the year after any stock price decline, consumer spend-
ing falls, on average, 40 for every $1 decrease in stock 
prices (U.S. President 1988, p. 42). On October 19, 
stock prices dropped almost $1 trillion, or nearly 
$4,000 per person in the United States. This suggests 
that this year consumer spending should drop nearly 
$40 billion because of the crash. 
Not so easy to estimate are all the other potential 
effects of the crash on the U.S. economy. Spending by 
businesses on plant and equipment, for example, could 
be cut back because their cost of capital has changed. 
Inventory investment could slow because firms ex-
pect consumer spending to fall. This could mean layoffs 
and lower employment—which would exacerbate the 
1A recession is defined here as two consecutive quarters of decline in the 
industrial production index, not in the real gross national product (GNP). This is 
because quarterly GNP data are not available for any year before 1947. 
Quarterly industrial production data begin in 1919. The data I use here are 
seasonally adjusted. 
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slump in consumer spending and the crash's reverbera-
tions throughout the economy. 
A way to estimate the likely overall economic effects 
of a crash is to use a model of the U.S. economy which 
captures the historical relationships among many mea-
sures of different types of economic activity and 
projects them into the future. I will use a model devel-
oped and maintained by researchers at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
2 This model uses statis-
tical methods to predict by extrapolating from the 
relationships among 47 economic variables since 1947. 
Unlike most other forecasting models, it is purely a 
statistical model; no one adjusts its forecasts to reflect 
judgments about what will happen to the economy. 
Admittedly, the historical data in this model do not 
include many stock market crashes: Since 1947, stock 
prices have fallen as much as 23 percent within six 
months only two other times. Still, this model can 
capture many effects of the recent crash. It tracks how 
other economic variables have reacted to stock price 
changes of all sizes. It then uses the average relation-
ships among these variables to predict the effects of any 
change in stock prices. It assumes, that is, that these 
relationships don't change much when stock prices 
change much more than usual. 
What this simple, history-based model has to say 
about the crash should be at least as reliable as what 
other, larger models have to say, for it has in the past 
performed reasonably well compared to them. McNees 
(1986) found that from 1980 to 1985 this type of model 
was more accurate than commercial forecasting mod-
els at predicting the national unemployment rate and 
growth in the inflation-adjusted gross national product 
(real GNP). This model's predictions for those variables 
in 1987 weren't too bad, either (Roberds and Todd 
1987). In the fourth quarter of 1987, the unemploy-
ment rate was predicted to be 6.5 percent; it actually 
was 5.9 percent. Between the fourth quarters of 1986 
and 1987, real GNP was predicted to grow 3.8 percent; 
it grew 3.9 percent. 
To see the model's estimate of the overall effect of 
the crash, I need merely compare two of its more recent 
forecasts of real GNP. One is a 1988 forecast based on 
data available through September 1987, the month be-
fore the crash. The other is a simulated 1988 forecast— 
a prediction made by the model assuming that the only 
new information it had about October was that stock 
prices would drop 23 percent. The difference between 
the two forecasts is the model's initial prediction of 
what history says the overall effect of the crash should 
be this year. 
Chart 1 
A History-Based Model's Early Estimate 
of the Crash's Effect on Economic Activity 
Quarterly Percentage Changes in Real GNP at an Annual Rate, Predicted 
With Data Available in September 1987, With and Without a 23% Drop 
in Stock Prices in October 1987* 
\ A  \A 
\ Without Crash 




"The data for the first two quarters of 1987 are actual, not predicted. 
Source of actual data: U.S Department of Commerce 
1988 
That effect appears to be serious. As is clear in 
Chart 1, the crash makes the model much more 
pessimistic about growth in 1988. Just before the crash, 
the model expected real GNP to grow 2 percent this 
year. Told of the crash, the model slashes that predic-
tion 1.5 percentage points, to a mere 0.5 percent. Note, 
too, that the model expects real output to actually 
decline in the first quarter of 1988. 
. . . Contradicted 
Thus, historical evidence strongly suggests that the 
stock market crash should substantially reduce real 
growth this year, if not cause a recession. Yet recent 
economic data and the model's latest predictions are 
quite strong. In fact, they look almost as though nothing 
unusual had happened in the stock market. 
Recent data on both consumer spending and general 
economic activity have been much stronger than the 
model's initial prediction for the economy, just after the 
crash. The accompanying table shows that several 
measures of consumer spending and aggregate mea-
sures of production and employment have all grown 
much more since the crash than the model predicted. 
2Litterman 1984 and Todd 1984 provide background information on 
Bayesian vector autoregression models like this one. 
3 Surprising Strength Since the Crash 
Percentage Changes at an Annual Rate Between October 1987 and January 1988* 
Spending by Individuals 
On All Goods On Durable At Retail Industrial Total 
& Services Goods Stores Production Employment 
Early Model Prediction** 1.0 -2.1 4.5 -4.3 1.2 
Actual 4.1 20.1 8.0 3.9 4.1 
*For total and durable goods spending only. For the others, these are the geometric means of monthly growth rates: for retail sales and the industrial production index, 
between November 1987 and January 1988; for employment, between December 1987 and February 1988. 
"Predicted with data available in September 1987 and a 23% drop in stock prices in October 1987. 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor, Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
In fact, recent economic news has been so positive 
that the model's current forecast is not much different 
than its forecast before the crash.
3 (See Charts 2 and 3.) 
This is especially true for output (Chart 2). Again, in 
September, before the crash, the model expected real 
GNP to grow 2 percent in 1988; now the model expects 
it to grow 1.9 percent. The only difference between the 
two forecasts is that growth is now predicted to be 
weaker in the first half of the year and stronger in the 
second half. In terms of annual rates, the first-half 
prediction has dropped from 2.1 percent to 1.2 percent; 
but the second-half prediction has jumped from 2 per-
cent to 2.5 percent. 
The outlook for unemployment has only changed for 
the better: The model is somewhat more optimistic 
about it now than before the crash (Chart 3). In 
September, the model predicted that the quarterly 
unemployment rate would gradually rise in 1988 and 
average 6 percent. Now the model expects the rate 
instead to gently decline in the year and average 5.7 
percent. 
As Yet, No Solution 
Many explanations have been offered for the puzzling 
economic strength and optimism since the crash. Three 
of these at first glance seem particularly plausible. On 
closer examination, however, two of them are clearly 
wrong and the third, while perhaps right, cannot be 
judged so without much more research. 
Offsetting Interest Rates or Trade? 
The first explanation involves the movement of long-
term interest rates at the time of the crash. When stock 
prices fell last fall, these rates quickly fell, too, as 
investors tried to shift their portfolios from stocks to 
bonds. In the last two weeks of October, long-term rates 
dropped 1.2 percentage points. These interest rate 
changes have two major effects which may have offset 
the effects of the stock market crash. 
One effect of any decline in long-term interest rates 
is a rise in the price of bonds—which means, of course, 
an increase in the wealth of individual bondholders. 
Some analysts think that the wealth gained from the 
bond price rise that accompanied the October interest 
rate fall prevented the crash from having negative 
effects on the economy: it simply replaced in U.S. 
portfolios the amount of wealth lost in the crash. With 
no change in total wealth despite the crash, economic 
activity would not be expected to be changed by it. 
While perhaps appealing in its simplicity, this story 
cannot be true, because stocks and bonds are quite 
different types of assets. A stock represents partial own-
ership of a firm. When its value falls, wealth is lost. A 
bond, however, is a loan, an obligation by a debtor to 
repay a creditor. When the value of a bond rises, the 
creditor's assets increase, but so do the debtor's liabil-
ities: the total wealth of debtors and creditors does not 
change. Thus, a rise in the value of bonds cannot offset a 
fall in the value of stocks. 
3The current forecast is based on data available on March 10, 1988. The 
accompanying box shows the 1988-89 forecast in detail, along with some 
historical perspective. 
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Charts 2 and 3 
The Model's Revised View of 1988 
Predictions* Made With Data Available 
— Before the Crash (in September 1987) 
Six Months Later (in March 1988) 
Chart 2 Real GNP Growth 
Quarterly Percentage Changes at an Annual Rate 
%  6 
1987 
Chart 3 Unemployment Rate 
Quarterly Levels of Unemployment 
as a Percentage of the Labor Force 
1988 
1987  1988 
*The 1987 data are actual, not predicted—except tor the third and fourth quarters for the 
September forecasts. 
Sources of actual data: U.S Departments of Commerce and Labor 
The other interest rate effect said to offset the effects 
of the crash is a change in people's decisions about how 
much to spend today rather than save today in order to 
spend tomorrow. The drop in long-term interest rates 
last fall could have made spending now seem much 
more attractive than before. And this increased spend-
ing due to decreased interest rates could have been 
great enough to at least partially offset the depressing 
effects of the stock market crash. 
A fast way to check whether interest rate effects 
actually could be offsetting the effects of the crash is to 
have the model predict real GNP growth after the 
declines in both stock prices and interest rates and 
compare that predicted growth to the model's predic-
tion before either decline. If the effects of the interest 
rate fall really erased the effects of the stock price fall, 
then the two predictions should be the same. 
They are not. Recall that the model predicted in 
September, before the crash, that real GNP would grow 
2 percent in 1988. When it is given that same data 
available in September plus the paths of stock prices 
and interest rates for the rest of 1987, the model's pre-
diction for real GNP growth drops to just 0.6 percent. 
Therefore, the decline in interest rates cannot be 
responsible for the economy's current strength and the 
model's current optimism. 
A second, very different explanation for the current 
strength and optimism is that the negative effects of the 
stock market crash on the U.S. economy have been 
overwhelmed by the rapid improvement in the U.S. 
trade balance in the months since the crash. Certainly, 
the trade balance has been better than expected since 
the crash. With September data and the crash, the 
model predicted that the annualized value of the trade 
deficit would be $145 billion between November and 
January. Actually, in those months, the trade deficit was 
$130 billion. 
Still, a broader perspective reveals that other factors 
must be responsible for the economic strength since the 
crash. The stock market crash, after all, was worldwide, 
so if it had a depressing economic effect, then that effect 
also should have been worldwide. And if the improved 
U.S. trade balance were offsetting that effect in this 
country, then the worsening trade balances of U.S. 
trading partners should be exacerbating the effect in 
those countries. But this is not what is happening. The 
U.S. trade balance has improved since the crash, while 
Great Britain's and Japan's, for example, have wor-
sened, yet economic activity in all of these countries 
continues to be strong. 
Temporary Wealth? 
A third explanation for the current economic strength 
and optimism is that people didn't change their spend-
ing after the loss in wealth that accompanied the crash 
because it wasn't a loss to them; in fact, they expected it. 
According to this explanation, the crash came after a 
large increase in stock prices last spring and summer 
5 The U.S. Economic Outlook 
for 1988-89 
Here is what the Minneapolis Fed re-
searchers' model is currently predicting for 
selected U.S. economic variables in 1988 
and 1989, along with how well those vari-
ables did last year and how well they have 
done, on average, over the last 40 years. 
(The current prediction is based on data 
available on March 10, 1988.) 
Indicator 
Annual Growth Rates 




1988  1989 
(Unemployment as a % of the Labor Force) 
1948-87 
Average 
Real Gross National Product  3.9%  1.9%  3.1%  3.3% 
Consumer Spending  0.8  3.3  2.9  3.4 
Durable Goods  -3.7  6.3  2.8  5.1 
Nondurable Goods & Services  1.7  2.8  3.0  3.2 
Investment  13.7  -1.8  5.2  4.4 
Business Fixed  4.5  3.8  3.5  3.7 
Residential  -2.4  3.1  7.0  3.9 
Government Purchases  3.2  1.7  2.2  3.7 
Gross National Product Deflator  3.3  3.2  3.6  4.2 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories  56.6 bit.  19.9 bil.  25.7 bil.  — 
(Bils. of 1982 $) 
Net Exports (Bils. of 1982 $)  -136.4 bil.  -147.7 bil.  -155.4 bil.  — 
(Exports less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  5.9%  5.7%  5.7%  5.7% 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments ot Commerce and Labor 
which was caused by speculation or other factors 
unrelated to the financial health of firms. Any apparent 
gain in wealth caused by such factors would not be 
expected to last. Thus, when stock prices dropped, 
economic activity would not be affected: not having felt 
a gain from the stock price rise, people would not feel a 
loss from the crash. 
One way to investigate this explanation for the 
missing economic effects of the crash is to examine data 
on last year's durable goods purchases. Spending on 
durable goods—things like automobiles, appliances, 
and furniture—is highly volatile because these goods 
are not so much daily necessities as they are long-term 
investments. Nondurable goods like food and clothing 
must be bought in both good times and bad. However, 
when times are bad, purchases of durable goods are 
often postponed until times start to look good again.
4 
People's current attitudes about their wealth, that is, are 
generally reflected in their spending on durable goods. 
Data on this spending in the first half of last year 
seem to be consistent with the temporary wealth expla-
nation for economic activity since the crash. Stock 
prices rose 20 percent during the first half of 1987, 
much more rapidly than the model predicted early in the 
year. At that time, the model expected durable goods 
purchases to increase at an annual rate of 4.4 percent 
in the first half of 1987. If people believed that their new 
stock market wealth would last, they should have 
increased their spending on durable goods more than 
they had been expected to. But they don't seem to have. 
In fact, instead of increasing, durable goods purchases 
fell at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in the first half. 
Data for the second half of the year are consistent 
with the temporary wealth explanation, too. If people 
believed that the crash really decreased their wealth, 
then durable goods purchases after it should have been 
lower than predicted before the crash. But as we saw 
earlier (on the table), that is not true. In the three months 
after the crash, durable goods purchases were expected 
to fall at an annual rate of 2.1 percent; they actually in-
creased 20.1 percent. 
All of these data on durable goods spending suggest 
that the movements in stock prices last year did not 
affect people's wealth perceptions or their consumption 
decisions. But the idea of temporary wealth has other 
implications which should be studied and confirmed 
before this explanation for the current strength and 
4For evidence on the volatility of durable goods consumption and its 
usefulness as a leading economic indicator, see Prescott 1983. 
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optimism is judged correct. While such a comprehen-
sive study is beyond my scope here, I offer two specific 
suggestions for further research. One is to examine 
whether or not purchases of houses and other major 
assets changed after the crash. The other is to conduct a 
survey to discover whether or not people felt poorer or 
changed their economic behavior because of the crash. 
The temporary wealth explanation implies that neither 
of these types of data should show any changes. 
No Puzzle? 
Thus, I end where I began: puzzled by the economic 
strength and optimism since the October stock market 
crash. Some evidence suggests that people may not 
have considered last year's large swings in stock values 
to be changes in their wealth, but more evidence is 
needed to be confident about that explanation. On rumi-
nation, another potential explanation comes to mind. 
Perhaps the depressing effect of the stock market crash 
has merely been delayed for some reason, so that 
eventually there will be no puzzle to explain. According 
to the model, this is certainly possible. When the model 
estimates the uncertainty in its latest forecast, it says 
that the U.S. economy still has a 23 percent chance of 
falling into a recession this year. This potential explana-
tion may not be reassuring, but at least we can be sure 
that it will be tested by time. 
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